Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions by Bredin, Jonathan & Parkes, David C.
Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions
Jonathan Bredin
Department of Mathematics
Colorado College
Colorado Springs, CO 80903
bredin@acm.org
David C. Parkes
Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138
parkes@eecs.harvard.edu
Abstract
Online double auctions (DAs) model a dy-
namic two-sided matching problem with pri-
vate information and self-interest, and are
relevant for dynamic resource and task al-
location problems. We present a general
method to design truthful DAs, such that no
agent can benefit from misreporting its ar-
rival time, duration, or value. The family
of DAs is parameterized by a pricing rule,
and includes a generalization of McAfee’s
truthful DA to this dynamic setting. We
present an empirical study, in which we study
the allocative-surplus and agent surplus for
a number of different DAs. Our results il-
lustrate that dynamic pricing rules are im-
portant to provide good market efficiency for
markets with high volatility or low volume.
1 INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of matching self-interested
parties in dynamic multi-agent systems. Cast as a
task-allocation problem, each agent arrives in some
period and is present in the system for some finite
period of time. An agent is either a seller, able to per-
form a single job while present, or a buyer, with a job
to complete. All jobs are identical, and any present
agent can perform a job. All jobs are completed in a
unit period of time. The arrival, departure, and cost
(if a seller) or value (if a buyer) are all private infor-
mation to agents. Moreover, each agent is assumed to
be self-interested and willing to misreport its private
information (including arrival and departure times) if
this can improve the outcome in its favor.
We model this problem as an online double auction
for identical items. The matchmaker becomes the auc-
tioneer. For dynamic task allocation, an item repre-
sents a task to be performed. Each agent is only willing
to buy (or sell) a single unit of the item. Uncertainty
about the future coupled with the two-sided nature of
the market leads to an interesting mechanism design
problem.
For example, consider the scenario where the auction-
eer must decide how (and whether) to pair an imme-
diately departing seller with reported cost of $6 with
buyers, one of which has a reported value of $8 and one
a reported value of $9. Should the auctioneer pair the
higher bidder with the seller? What happens if a seller
willing to sell for $4 arrives after the auctioneer acts
upon the matching decision? How should the match-
ing algorithm be designed so that no agent can benefit
from misstating its private constraints on arrival and
departure, and its private cost or value information?
We introduce a general framework for the design of
truthful double auctions (DAs) in this dynamic model.
The DAs are truthful in the sense that the optimal
strategy for an agent, whatever the future auction dy-
namics and whatever the bids from other agents, is to
report its true value (or cost for sellers) and true depar-
ture period immediately upon arrival into the auction.
We obtain auctions that are truthful in a dominant-
strategy equilibrium (DSE). This is useful because it
simplifies the decision problem facing bidders. An
agent can determine its optimal bidding strategy with-
out a model of either the auction dynamics or the other
agents.
The main technical challenge is to provide truthfulness
while also ensuring (weak) budget-balance. We require
that DAs do not run at a deficit, i.e. at no point in
time should the auctioneer have paid more than it has
received. In developing a family of truthful auctions
we apply the price-based characterization from Haji-
aghayi et al. [9] to develop an implementable price
rule that satisfies the required properties of agent-
independence and monotonicity. This ensures truth-
fulness in a DSE. To prevent the auction running at
a deficit, the individualized price faced by each agent
to trade must increase across time. We make no such
assumption, however, on the global price schedule, for
instance as in Lavi and Nisan [13], because we study
an infinite time horizon setting that continuously runs
a DA.
Truthfulness in DAs also requires new elements, for in-
stance an agent’s bid value can only influence the price
faced by other agents once it is determined whether
the agent will trade or not. This is important because
the availability of trades depends on the price faced by
other agents. For example, a buyer that is required
to pay $4 in the DA to trade might like to decrease
the price that a potentially matching seller will receive
from $6 to $3 to allow for trade. In this aspect, our
approach generalizes the truthful DA of McAfee [14]
to the online setting.
Our main contribution is the characterization of a
family of parameterized truthful DAs. Different price
schedules can be substituted and used within match-
ing. From within this class we describe a fixed price
scheme, exponentially-weighted moving average and
windowed-average schemes, and a scheme based on
McAfee’s rules for a static DA [14]. An empirical anal-
ysis illustrates the market efficiency of each auction for
different market conditions. For high-volume and low
volatility markets, setting a single well-chosen price
is reasonably effective in supporting efficient trades.
However, when volume is lower or when demand is
volatile, then DAs with dynamic pricing rules, perhaps
moving-average or McAfee-based, are most efficient.
1.1 RELATED WORK
Static two-sided market problems have been widely
studied [15, 4, 17, 21, 7]. In a classic result, Myer-
son and Satterthwaite [15] proved that it was impos-
sible to achieve efficiency with voluntary participation
and without running a deficit, even relaxing DSE to a
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.1
Our problem is also similar to a traditional continuous
double auction (CDA), where buyers and sellers may
at any time submit offers to a market that pairs an
offer as soon as a matching offer is submitted. Early
work considered market efficiency of CDAs with hu-
man experiments in labs [18], while recent work inves-
tigates the use of software agents to execute trades [19].
While these markets have no dominant strategy equi-
libria, populations of software trading agents can learn
to extract virtually all available surplus, and even sim-
ple automated trading strategies outperform human
traders [6]. However, these studies of CDAs assume
that all traders share a known deadline by which trades
1In a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium each strategy must
maximize the expected utility of an agent given its beliefs
about the types of the other agents.
must be executed. This is quite different from our set-
ting, in which we have dynamic arrival and departure.
Some truthful DAs are known for static problems [14,
11, 2, 1]. For instance, McAfee [14] introduced a
DA that sometimes forfeits trade in return for achiev-
ing truthfulness. Truthful one-sided online auctions,
in which agents arrive and depart across time, have
received some recent attention [13, 10, 9, 16, 12].
We adopt and extend the monotonicity-based truth-
ful characterization in the work of Hajiaghayi et al. [9]
in developing our framework for truthful DAs. Our
model of DAs must also address some of the same
constraints on timing that occur in Porter [16] and
Hajiaghayi et al. [9] and Lavi and Nisan [12]. In these
previous works, the items were reusable or expiring and
could only be allocated in particular periods. In our
work we provide limited allowance to the matchmaker,
allowing it to hold onto a seller’s item until a matched
buyer is ready to depart (perhaps after the seller has
departed).
Blum et al. [3] present online matching algorithms
whose competitive ratios depend on the spread in of-
fer valuations. This earlier work does not consider
incentive-compatibility, and is presented purely from
an algorithmic perspective.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In our model of online DAs we consider discrete time
periods T = {0, 1, 2, . . .}, with buyers and sellers that
arrive and depart over time are each interested in trad-
ing a single unit of an identical good.
An agent i has type, vi = (ai, di, ri, wi) ∈ V , where
ri ∈ {b, s} indicates whether an agent is a buyer (b)
or a seller (s), ai ∈ T is the arrival time, and di ∈ T ,
with di ≥ ai, denotes the departure time. For a buyer,
wi ∈ R≥0 defines its value for receiving one unit of the
item while present. For a seller, wi ∈ R≤0 defines its
value for selling one unit of the item while present.23
We interpret an agent’s arrival time as either the time
at which it first becomes aware of the auction, or the
time at which it first becomes aware of its desire to
trade. For a buyer, we interpret the departure period
as the final period in which it values the item. For a
seller, the departure period is the final period in which
it is willing to receive payment.
2This simple “step-function” model of temporal pref-
erences, in which an agent is indifferent for some period
of time and then has no value, is adopted throughout the
current literature on truthful online auctions.
3In general, we use the term bid to refer to offers from
both buyers and sellers. Sometimes we need to refer to
offers from the buy-side or sell-side in particular, in which
case we will reserve bid for buyers and ask for offers from
sellers.
From the example in the introduction, the two buyers
could have types v1 = (1, 4, b, 8) and v2 = (2, 5, b, 9),
and the seller could have type v3 = (2, 3, b,−6). At
time 3, the auctioneer may consider pairing v3 with one
of the two bids, since either of the two buyers will meet
v3’s ask price. The value for trades in all other periods
is zero for buyers and −∞ for sellers, indicating that
no agent will trade outside of its patience interval.
Agents are assumed to be self-interested, and their
types are private information. The truthful DAs that
we model are direct-revelation, meaning that an agent
bids by making a claim about its type, i.e. report-
ing type vˆi = (aˆi, dˆi, rˆi, wˆi) = vi to the auction.4 An
agent’s self-interest is exhibited in its willingness to
misrepresent its type when this will improve the out-
come of the DA in its favor (e.g. matching at a ben-
eficial price when not matching with truthful reports,
or matching at a better price.)
We make the following assumptions:
(A1) Agents cannot understate their arrival period,
i.e. aˆi ≥ ai.
(A2) All agents have a bounded patience, with di ≤
ai + K, for all vi ∈ V .
(A3) The auctioneer can “hold” an item that is
matched between a seller-buyer pair, releasing it
when the buyer is ready to depart.
(A4) No false-name bids, and no collusion.
Assumption (A1) is standard and is consistent with
our interpretation of the arrival time. Other misre-
ports are allowed in the model. Assumption (A2) is
novel, but required for our family of mechanisms be-
cause it is enables the definition of an individualized,
yet increasing price, to each agent. Assumption (A3) is
required to achieve truthfulness with agents that are
able to over-state their departure, because it allows
the appropriate timing of trades.5 We need assump-
tion (A4), no false-name bids [20] (submitting multiple
bids as a single bidder) and no collusion, because in
both cases an agent could influence the price it faces
or the price to agents on the other side of the market.
2.1 DESIDERATA
A DA is defined as a pair, M = (g, p˜), with alloca-
tion rule, g, and payment rule, p˜. The allocation rule,
gi(vˆ≤t, t) = 1, indicates that agent i buys an item in
period t, given bids vˆ≤t = {vˆj = (aˆj , dˆj , wˆj) : aˆj ≤ t},
4This is without loss of generality, since the revelation
principle continues to hold for online mechanisms [8].
5In a task-allocation setting, this assumption is inter-
preted as allowing the matchmaker to hold onto the result
of completing the task (e.g. some computational result)
until the matched buyer is ready to depart.
and gi(vˆ≤t, t) = −1 indicates that agent i sells an item
in period t. The payment rule p˜i(vˆ≤t, t) ∈ R indicates
a payment made by agent i to the auctioneer in pe-
riod t (this is a payment from the auctioneer to the
agent when p˜i(vˆ≤t, t) < 0). We need gi(v≤t, t) ≥ 0 for
all buyers, with gi(v≤t, t) = 1 in at most one period
t ∈ [ai, di] and zero otherwise (and similarly for sellers,
with gi(v≤t, t) ≤ 0 and gi(v≤t, t) = −1 in at most one
period t ∈ [ai, di].) Payments can only be made (or
collected) when an agent is present.
We assume that agents have quasi-linear utility func-
tions, so that the utility for a trade x at some price p is
the value from the trade minus the payment. Agents
are modeled as utility-maximizing. Given assumption
(A1), we adopt L(vi) ⊆ V to denote the set of possible
reports, given true type vi. Set L(vi) contains all types
vˆi ∈ V for which aˆi ≥ ai. We can now define truth-
fulness. Truthfulness requires that no misreport can
ever improve an agent’s utility, whatever the reports
of other agents and whatever the future dynamics:
Definition 1 (Truthfulness). A mechanism M =
(g, p˜), where g is an allocation rule and p˜ is a payment
rule, is truthful if for any agent i and any vi, we have
vi(gi(v)) − p˜i(v) ≥ vi(gi(vˆi, v−i)) − p˜i(vˆi, v−i), for all
vˆi ∈ L(vi) and all v−i.
Here, allocation gi(v) =
∑
t′∈[ai,di] gi(v≤t′ , t
′), and in-
dicates whether agent i gets the item in any period,
gi(vˆi, v−i) is shorthand for “the allocation for agent i
given that the bids from other agents are v−i and agent
i bids vˆi,” and value vi(x) = wi if x = 1 and 0 other-
wise. Payment p˜i(v) =
∑
t∈[ai,di] p˜i(v≤t, t), and is the
total payment across all periods in its arrival departure
interval, and p˜i(vˆi, v−i) is shorthand for “the payment
by agent i given that the bids from other agents are
v−i and agent i bids vˆi.”
In addition to truthfulness, we adopt the following as
required properties of DAs:
Definition 2 (No-Deficit). A mechanism M =
(g, p˜) runs at no-deficit if:
∑
i:di<t
p˜i(v) +
∑
i:ai≤t≤di
∑
t′∈[ai,t]
p˜i(v, t′) ≥ 0, ∀t, ∀v. (1)
No-deficit requires that the auctioneer has money on
hand in each time period.
Definition 3 (Feasible Trade). A mechanism M =
(g, p˜) is feasible if:
∑
i:di<t
gi(v) +
∑
i:ai≤t≤di
∑
t′∈[ai,t]
gi(v, t′) ≥ 0, ∀t, ∀v. (2)
Feasibility requires that the auctioneer has physical
goods on hand in each time period. This still provides
flexibility to the auctioneer to hold onto items until a
matched buyer is ready to depart.
3 PRICE-RANKED DOUBLE
AUCTIONS
We define a family of truthful, no-deficit and feasible
online DAs. The DAs are parameterized by a price
schedule, fi, that when coupled with a simple match-
ing rule defines an allocation rule g and payment rule
p˜. In Section 4 we prove that any DA for which the
price schedule fi is valid will be truthful.
At the start of period t, bids in the auction that are
within their patience interval (i.e. t ∈ [ai, di]) can be in
one of three states: matched, priced-out, or active. A
matched bid will definitely trade and its price has been
determined. A bid is priced-out when the auction has
determined that it will definitely not trade. An active
bid is neither priced-out nor matched, and whether or
not it will trade remains uncertain.
For all bids and all periods t while a bid is active
or not yet arrived, we define a valid price schedule
fi(t, ri, v−i) ∈ R to determine the price to buy (with
ri = b) or sell (with ri = s) an item in period t given
bids v−i from other agents.6
Definition 4 (Valid price schedule). A price-
schedule, f , is valid if it satisfies each of the following
three properties in any period t before a bid is priced-
out or matched:
(B1) Price fi(t, ri, v−i) does not depend on the arrival
time, departure time, or on the reported value, of
bidder i.
(B2) Price fi(t, ri, v−i) does not depend on bids that
arrive after period t.
(B3) While fi(t, ri, v−i) ≤ wi the price does not de-
pend on the value of any bids j = i that are active
at the start of period t and have fj(t, rj , v−i) ≤
wj. Otherwise, if fi(t, ri, v−i) > wi then we
also have fi(t, ri, v−i) > wi for all values of bids
j = i that are active at the start of period t while
fj(t, rj , v−i) ≤ wj.
Property (B1) states agent independence and requires
that the price is independent of all elements of an
agent’s reported type except whether or not it claims
to be a buyer or a seller. Property (B2) asserts on-line
computability.
Property (B3) limits the way in which a price to
agent i can depend on the bids from other agents.
This property is novel to online DA, and required
6This price is best thought of as a lower bound on the
final payment made, and is only exact if all agents are
impatient (i.e. for K = 1).
to achieve truthfulness in combination with budget-
balance. Note that the price can depend in arbi-
trary ways on information in bids that have departed,
matched in a previous period, or priced-out. Infor-
mally, property (B3) states “if you might still trade
then your bid should not affect the price of other bids
that might still trade or whether or not other bids are
priced-out.” First, if bid i is priced below its value,
with fi(t, ri, v−i) ≤ wi, then its price must be inde-
pendent of the reported value of all bids active at the
start of the period and with a price in this period that
allows them to remain active. Second, if bid i is priced
above its value then it must be priced-out whatever the
bid values from other bids.
In the next section we define simple price schedules
that satisfy (B1)–(B3). For now, we define the match-
ing function that completes the definition of our class
of DAs. The price-ranked DAs, Mpr(f), define a
provisional price, p˜si(t), to agent i in period t, as:
p˜si(t) = max
τ∈{di−k,...,t}
{fi(τ, ri, v−i)}, (3)
for all periods t until the bid is matched or departs.
Here, the dependence on the reported type of the agent
and on the reports of other agents is left implicit.
Definition 5 (Price-Ranked Matching Rule). At
the start of each period t, the matching rule considers
those bids that are still active. For these bids,
1. Compute the new price fi(t, ri, v−i) to each active
bid. Mark all active bids for which fi(t, ri, v−i) >
wi as priced-out. Update p˜si(t) = max{p˜si(t −
1), fi(t, ri, v−i)} for the remaining active bids.
2. Sort the active bids into a bid book, in order of
decreasing price fi(t, ri, v−i). Sort the active asks
into an ask book, in order of decreasing price
fj(t, rj , v−j). Break ties at random.
3. Match bids and asks while fi(t, ri, v−i) +
fj(t, rj , v−j) ≥ 0, matching from the top of
the bid book and the ask book. Set the payment to
a matched bidder as p˜i(v) = p˜si(t).
Once matched, a trade between a pair of agents is timed
as follows: if the seller departs first, the buyer makes
payment at this time and the seller provides the item to
the auctioneer, which releases the item at the departure
of the buyer; if the buyer departs first, the seller pro-
vides the item to the buyer at this time and the buyer
pays the auctioneer which releases the payment at the
departure of the seller
As an example, assume that we have a price sched-
ule fi(t, r, vi) with which to match offers and that
the patience bound K is 5. A bid vi = (10, 13, b, 6)
arrives. The auctioneer must compute a provisional
price using Equation 3 over periods 8, 9, and 10. Say
fi(8, b, v−i) = 7, fi(9, b, v−i) = 5, and fi(10, b, v−i) =
4. Then vi is marked as priced-out and will never be
considered for matching. If, however the bidder is
more patient and vi = (10, 14, b, 6), then the auction-
eer places vi into the bid book sorted by fj(10, b, v−j).
The auctioneer matches offers from the front of the
bid and ask books, matching bid i with ask j only
if doing so would yield budget balance at the cur-
rent price– if fi(b, 10, v−i) + fj(s, 10, v−j) ≥ 0. In that
event, bidder i pays 5, the maximum price faced over
its theoretical lifetime. If vi does not match in period
10, then it is kept until it expires, sorted in the bid
book by the most recent fi(t, b, v−i). The auctioneer
removes vi either when vi trades, expires, or is priced
out (wi = 6 < fi(t, b, v−i)).
3.1 VALID PRICE SCHEDULES
The family of truthful DAs is defined in terms of valid
price schedules. The main constraint for a price sched-
ule to be valid is that the price in any period must be
independent of the active bids in that period. In this
section, we present three schedules: fixed price, mov-
ing average (exponential and windowed), and McAfee-
based. The price-ranked DAs defined for each schedule
are evaluated in Section 5.
3.1.1 Fixed Pricing
A basic price schedule sets a fixed price, with
ffixedi (t, ri, v−i) =
{
p∗b if, ri = b
p∗s if, ri = s
and p∗b ≥ 0 and p∗s ≤ 0 set to maximize efficiency given
prior beliefs of the auctioneer (or via experimentation),
and generally with p∗b = −p∗s. The fixed price schedule
trivially satisfies (B1)–(B3) by construction. A fixed-
price schedule is shown to perform reasonably when
the market is predictable and when volume is high.
3.1.2 Moving Average
The fixed-price schedule is not appropriate when mar-
ket conditions fluctuate. Instead, we can adapt an
exponentially-weighted moving average on some statis-
tic of the offers that have expired, priced-out or
matched in the current period. Alternatively, we can
compute a similar statistic on a rolling window of these
bids.
An exponentially-weighted moving average price is de-
fined for buyers and sellers, respectively, as
f ewmai (t, b, v−i) =
λ ξ(vt−1) + (1− λ)f ewmai (t− 1, b, v−i),
f ewmai (t, s, v−i) =
−λ ξ(vt−1) + (1 − λ)f ewmai (t− 1, s, v−i),
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is a smoothing constant. Here, ξ(vt),
is a statistic defined on the values of offers (bids and
asks) that expire, are priced-out, or trade in period t,
denoted vt. We find that the mean statistic, ξmean(vt),
of the absolute values of offers performs well.
An alternate approach computes the price schedule
from a statistic over a fixed-size window of the most re-
cent expired, priced-out, and traded offers. The price
is simply fwindowi (t, b, v−i) = ξ(vt−1,φ) for buyers and
fwindowi (t, s, v−i) = −ξ(vt−1,φ) for sellers, where we
update the meaning of vt,φ to represent the set of the
most recent φ expiring, priced-out, and traded offers
up to time t. We find that two statistics work well:
the median of absolute values of offers, and a simple
calculation that sets a clearing price to maximize the
number of matching offers.
For cases in which ξ(vt−1) is not well-defined, usually
due to low volume leading to missing data because
no offers are in the sample set, we set fi(t, ri, v−i) =
fi(t−1, ri, v−i) in both the exponentially-weighted and
windowed schemes. Both moving averages implement
valid price schedules, satisfying (B1) and (B3) since no
bids that remain active in the current period are used
for pricing.
The main concern in setting prices is that they are
too volatile. Fluctuating prices make the constraint
wi ≥ p˜s(t) more difficult to satisfy, since provisional
prices are driven upwards through Equation (3). Price
fluctuation also creates a bid-ask price spread since
prices to both buyers and sellers are driven higher, so
that buyers pay more while sellers pay less (their pay-
ments are less negative). Smoothing and windowing
are useful for both of these reasons: providing long-
term learning while dampening short-term variations.
The choice of smoothing factor, λ, or window size can
be determined experimentally.
3.1.3 McAfee Rule
We can also adopt the pricing method in McAfee’s
DA [14] to define a valid price schedule for our online
auction setting. The main difference with the previous
methods is that it uses current bids to price trades.
This can help to make it more responsive.
McAfee’s DA is useful for the static problem of pair-
ing bids and asks present in a single time period. The
best way to understand McAfee’s clearing and pric-
ing rule is through a simple example. Consider 4
bids, with values (10, 6, 4, 2) and 4 asks, with values
(−2,−4,y,−12), with y ∈ {−6,−10}. Let m denote
the index of the last bid to clear, i.e. b(m) + s(m) ≥ 0
and b(m + 1) + s(m + 1) < 0, with m = 2 in our ex-
ample. McAfee’s rule is defined on two cases:
• (Case I) If there are at least m + 1 bids and asks
and price pm+1 = (b(m+ 1)− s(m + 1))/2 ≤ b(m)
and −pm+1 ≤ s(m) then the first m bids and asks
trade at price pm+1 for bids and −pm+1 for asks.
• (Case II) If there are fewer than m+1 bids or asks,
or the price test in (Case I) fails, then m − 1 bids
and asks trade at price b(m) for bids and price s(m)
for asks.
In our example, when y = −6 we are in Case I and
pm+1 = 5, but for y = −10 we are in Case II and
pm+1 = 7 and so only the first bid and ask trade,
at prices 6 and −4 respectively. McAfee’s auction is
truthful and does not run at a budget deficit, and im-
plements the efficient trade in Case I but forfeits one
trade in Case II.
We can now interpret McAfee’s auction in terms of an
agent-independent price function. For this, for bid i,
let mbi and msi denote the last bid and ask to clear
(in the sense of index m above) when bid i is removed
along with the maximal ask on the other side of the
market. For ask j, let mbj and msj denote the last bid
and ask to clear when ask j is removed along with the
maximal bid on the other side of the market. Consider
the example, with y = −10. For bid 2, we have mb2 =
1 with b(mb2) = 10 and ms2 = 2 with b(ms2) = −4.
For ask 3, we have mb3 = 3 with b(mb3) = 4 and
ms3 = 2 with s(ms3) = −4.
Now, McAfee’s DA can be understood in terms of
the following agent-independent prices, which we will
adopt for a price schedule.7 Let p(i) = (b(mbi + 1)−
s(msi + 1))/2. For a bid i, we have:
fmcafeei (t, b, v−i) =


p(i) if p(i) ≤ b(mbi)
and p(i) ≥ −s(msi)
b(mbi) otherwise.
For an ask j, we have:
fmcafeej (t, s, v−j) =


−p(j) if −p(j) ≤ s(msj)
and −p(j) ≥ −b(mbj)
s(msj) otherwise.
Consider the example, with y = −6. For bid 2, we
have p(2) = (4−(−6))/2 = 5 and p(2) = 5 ≤ b(mb2) =
b(1) = 10 and p(2) = 5 ≥ −s(ms2) = −s(2) = 4, and
so fmcafee2 (t, b, v−2) = p(2) = 5. For bid 3, we have
p(3) = (2 − (−12))/2 = 7 and p(3) = 7 > b(mb3) =
b(2) = 6 and so adopt fmcafee3 (t, b, v−3) = b(mb3) =
7When every bid (or every ask) clears then we to make
McAfee pricing well-defined we must also adopt 0 for miss-
ing bid prices b(mbi + 1) or b(mbj + 1), and adopt −∞
for missing ask prices. Similar special cases can also be
handled when one or more of mbi,msi,mbj or msj are
undefined.
b(2) = 6.8 The proof of the following is omitted in the
interest of space.
Proposition 1. The McAfee-based price schedule
is valid, and fmcafeej (t, s, v−j) equals the price in
McAfee’s DA in the current period for any agent j that
would trade in McAfee’s DA in the current period.
We can make the following immediate observation (the
proof is trivial and omitted in the interest of space):
Proposition 2. The price-ranked DA with a McAfee-
based price schedule reduces to a sequence of standard
McAfee auctions when every bidder is impatient, i.e.
with K = 1.
In passing, we observe that a potential problem with
McAfee in our online setting is that the price swings
may be large, driving a a large bid-ask price spread
through the max operator in Equation (3). However,
applying smoothing (as in the exponentially-weighted
moving average approach) in this case loses property
(B3) because decisions about which agents are priced-
out can be reversed via smoothing.
4 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we prove our main result which is that
each auction in the family of price-ranked DAs with
valid price schedules. First, we demonstrate the no-
deficit and feasibility properties.
Theorem 1. The price-ranked DA, Mpr(f), is no-
deficit and feasible.
Proof. To establish no-deficit, just observe that the
price-ranked DA only selects a bid-ask pair to match
when the sum of the current prices fi(t, ri, v−i) +
fj(t, rj , v−j) ≥ 0. By Equation (3), we know that
p˜si(t) ≥ fi(t, ri, v−i), for all agents and so checking for
no-deficit in terms of the simple price schedule f also
implies no-deficit in terms of the provisional prices that
become each agent’s payment. Feasibility is immedi-
ate, because we only match bids and asks in pairs.
To establish truthfulness for the price-ranked DAs we
appeal to the price-based characterization in Haji-
aghayi et al. [9]. This theory was constructed for one-
sided online auctions, but continues to hold for DAs.
Some care is required to handle the budget-balance
requirement in online DAs in a way that is consistent
with the properties required for truthfulness.
8The interested reader can check for this example that
these prices define the payments in the McAfee rule for
bids and asks that trade, and are priced above the value
of bids or asks that do not trade. In this example, the
buy-side prices are (5, 5, 6, 6) for y = −6 and (6, 7, 8, 8) for
y = −10 and the sell-side prices are (−5,−5,−4,−4) for
y = −6 and (−4,−2,−4,−4) for y = −10.
Definition 6 (Price-based Auctions). An on-
line auction is price-based if there exists a value-
independent price schedule pi(ai, di, ri, v−i) ∈ R, such
that, for all valuations v:
• (admissible) For all i, if rˆi = b then gi(v) = 1 if
and only if pi(ai, di, b, v−i) ≤ wi, and if rˆi = s then
gi(v) = −1 if and only if pi(ai, di, s, v−i) ≤ wi.
• (payments) For all i, if rˆi = b and gi(v) = 1 then
p˜i(v) = pi(ai, di, b, v−i), and if rˆi = s and gi(v) =
−1 then p˜i(v) = pi(ai, di, s, v−i).
Value-independent prices pi can depend on arrival, de-
parture and buy/sell type, but not on the value of a
bid. Property (admissible) states that an agent must
trade whenever its value is larger than the price. Prop-
erty (payments) states that the payment must be ex-
actly the price faced by the agent.
The following property of prices is important in estab-
lishing truthfulness:
Definition 7 (Monotonic). Prices are monotonic if
pi(ai, di, ri, v−i) ≤ pi(a′i, d′i, ri, v−i) for all a′i ≥ ai and
all d′i ≤ di, and all v−i and all ri.
In words, prices increase for tighter arrival-departure
windows. The following property places a constraint
on the timing of trades.
Definition 8 (Late allocations). Allocations are
late if no buyer receives an item before the critical
period tc(ai, di, b, v−i), and no seller receives payment
before the critical period tc(ai, di, s, v−i).
Here, the critical period, tc(ai, di, ri, v−i) is the first
period, t′ ∈ [ai, di], for which pi(ai, t′, ri, v−i) =
mint′′∈[ai,di]{pi(ai, t′′, ri, v−i)}, i.e. the first period in
which the price is minimal (with respect to ai, di and
ri). Thus, the late allocations property places a timing
constraint on the completion of a trade.
Theorem 2. [9] An online auction M = (g, p˜) is
truthful if and only if it is implemented by a price-based
auction for a monotonic and value-independent
price schedule, p, and if it also satisfies late alloca-
tions.
Thus, to establish truthfulness we need to establish
that the price-ranked DAs are implementing an alloca-
tion rule that is admissible with respect to some mono-
tonic and value-independent price schedule, and that
the timing satisfies the late allocations property.
Theorem 3. A price-ranked DA Mpr(f) is truthful
for price schedules that satisfy properties (B1), (B2)
and (B3).
First, note that an agent cannot usefully misrepresent
as an agent on the other side of the market. For a
buyer, it cannot be a seller because it has no item
to offer. A seller on the other hand has no value for
acquiring an item. The proof of Theorem 3 then fol-
lows from a series of technical lemmas. Taken together,
the lemmas imply the existence of a value-independent
price schedule pi(ai, di, ri, v−i) that is monotonic. No-
tice that we have the late allocations property by con-
struction, through the timing of trades (see Section 3).
Lemma 1. If an agent is matched in a price-ranked
DA in period t, then for fixed ai, di and v−i (and ran-
dom draws in the case of tie-breaking) the price is in-
dependent of its reported wi.
Proof. By induction on the period t since an agent’s
arrival ai, with the inductive hypothesis that either
the agent has not yet matched, or if it has matched it
has matched at a value-independent price. The base
case holds immediately. The inductive case is proved
by showing that conditioned on the match occurring
in period t ∈ [ai, di], then it is matched at a value-
independent price. For the bid to be matched, it must
not be priced-out and so we must have fi(t′, ri, v−i) ≤
wi for all periods t′ ∈ [di−k, . . . , t], such that p˜si(t) ≤
wi. Now, agent i cannot influence the price fj for
any agent j = i either now or in any previous pe-
riod (by B3), and so the provisional prices p˜sj(t) to
other agents are agent-independent and whether or not
other agents are priced-out is also agent-independent
(by B3). This implies that the budget-balance check
in the price-ranked matching function is independent
of agent i’s reported value. Finally, the ranking of bids
and asks when matching depends on fi and the final
price, p˜si(t), upon matching are both value indepen-
dent. To handle the case of tie-breaking, just assume
that the random draws are agent-independent.
Lemma 2. If an agent with reported value wi is not
matched in a price-ranked DA, then for fixed ai, di,
v−i (and random draws in the case of tie-breaking),
any w′i > wi for which would be matched would result
in a payment greater than wi.
Proof. Fix ai, di, v−i and wi, and assume that the
bid is not matched. We consider two cases. In each
case we argue that any misreport would lead to a price
greater than wi when the agent begins to match.
(Case 1) Bid i never met the budget-balance (BB)
condition, but was active with p˜si(t) ≤ wi for all
t ∈ [ai, di]. But, agent i cannot influence the BB con-
dition because this depends on its simple-price fi(t)
which is agent-independent and on the prices on the
other side of the market. But, while bid i it cannot
influence these prices (by B3).
(Case 2) Bid i never met the BB condition while ac-
tive, but from some period t onwards p˜si(t) > wi. In
this case, decreasing wi has no effect other than to
make the bid inactive earlier. Increasing wi may allow
the bid to remain active for more periods and perhaps
meet the BB condition and match. But, its payment
p˜si(t
′) in the period t′ ≥ t in which this occurs satisfies
p˜si(t′) > wi, since p˜si(t′) increases with time.
Lemma 3. Any time agent i with arrival ai and de-
parture di is matched its price is independent of its bid
price wi, given properties (B1)–(B3).
Proof. From Lemma 1 we know that if an agent is
matched in period t, then for fixed ai, di and v−i the
price is independent of its reported wi. Also, we know
that this price is no greater than the minimal wi for
which a match occurs (because otherwise a bid would
be priced out). So, the price must be less than or
equal to the minimal bid price across all bids that will
match. Then, from Lemma 2 we see that this price
must be greater than all prices wi on bids that do not
match. Putting this together, we see that there is a
value-independent price for trade in period t, that is
the minimal bid price that an agent could have bid and
traded in that period. Finally, note that for fixed [ai, di]
and fixed v−i the agent will always match in this period
for all bid values greater than this price, and so we can
associate this price with the price psi(ai, di, ri, v−i) as
required for the price-based characterization.
It should also be clear from this discussion that the
agent is matched, at this payment, if and only if its
bid price is greater than or equal to this price. The re-
maining condition in the price-based characterization
that we must establish is that of monotonicity. We
establish this through Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. Fix wi, v−i. The payment p˜si(t) increases
with [a′i, d
′
i] ⊆ [ai, di] and an agent cannot match in an
earlier period by reporting [a′i, d
′
i] ⊆ [ai, di].
Proof. First, notice that p˜si(t) defined in Equation (3)
is independent of ai and increases with an earlier de-
parture. So, the only thing left to show is that an
agent cannot bring its match forward by reporting
[a′, d′] ⊆ [a, d]. Notice that it would not be useful to
delay its match because p˜si(t) is (weakly) increasing
with t. Now, announcing an earlier departure does not
change the state of the auction in any round t′ ≤ d′
unless the agent is priced-out (because its provisional
price becomes higher). So, we must just consider the
case of an agent that delays its arrival. But, the only
effect is that an agent might forfeit an opportunity to
trade. Notice that a later arrival does not change its
price schedule of provisional price and so we can re-
strict attention to possible changes in the matching
procedure. But, the agent’s report has no effect on its
prices or the prices of other agents while it might still
trade (B3). So, the only effect could be to cause an
ask that would have matched with agent i to match
in a period before i’s delayed arrival. This only re-
duces the opportunities to agent i to match once it
has arrived.
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate in simulation each of the
price-ranked DAs introduced in Section 3.1. We mea-
sure the average value for the schedule (in compari-
son with the optimal offline solution), as well as the
revenue collected by the auctioneer (in comparison
with the value of the optimal offline solution). We
find that under stochastically stable demand the fixed-
price schedule is most efficient, but that this is unable
to support efficient matching when demand is more
volatile.
We use a commercial integer linear programming algo-
rithm (CPLEX) to compute the offline optimal solu-
tion. In determining the offline solution we enforce the
constraint that a trade can only be executed if both
buyer and seller are present in the same period. The
integer program formulation to maximize total value
across all feasible schedules is:
max
∑
(i,j)∈overlap
xij(wi + wj)
s.t. 0 ≤
∑
i:(i,j)∈overlap
xij ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ ask
0 ≤
∑
j:(i,j)∈overlap
xij ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ bid
xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, j,
where (i, j) ∈ overlap is a bid-ask pair that could po-
tentially trade because they have overlapping arrival
and departure intervals. Decision variable xij ∈ {0, 1}
indicates that bid i matches with ask j.
For the online pricing methods, the simulation per-
forms several training runs to learn the optimal fixed-
price and smoothing parameters before calculating
market efficiency.
5.1 EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP
For each experiment, the simulation runs 50 trials to
estimate the mean efficiency. The experiments fre-
quently require additional trials to learn parameters,
so there are 16 additional trials for each iteration of
the parameter search process. To compare the differ-
ent price schedules, the simulation uses the same sets
of bids and asks to drive each matching method.
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Figure 1: Mean allocative efficiency plotted against value volatility and arrival intensity. We also
plot the 95% confidence intervals.
Bids and asks are simulated to arrive to the market
using a Poisson schedule with fixed intensity until the
simulation creates 2000 bids and 2000 asks. Offer du-
rations are sampled from a truncated-exponential dis-
tribution. The distribution is truncated at the maxi-
mal patience value, with the truncation defined so that
95% of the exponential distribution fits within the pa-
tience bound [0,K]. To compare trials using different
patience bounds, we scale the arrival and departure
times to ensure that offers in each experiment have
the same expectation for possible trading partners.
The simulation uses a uniform distribution for buyer
and seller valuations. In each trial, the simulation
initializes the distribution to U [0, 2]. After after each
time period, the valuation mean either increases or
decreases by a relative amount fixed within the trial
according to unbiased geometric Brownian motion [5].
The variance of values remains fixed at
√
2 during each
time period.
5.2 RESULTS
Figure 1 plots the allocative surplus9 relative to the
optimal as a function of the inter-period valuation
volatility10 and expected time between offer arrivals.
The simulation sets the patience bound for both sets
of experiments to K = 5. When varying the volatil-
ity, the inter-arrival delay between offers is 0.25. The
volatility is
√
2/10 per period when inter-arrival time
is varied. We observe that when valuations do not
change, the fixed-price schedule performs reasonably
well. However, as volatility increases or as the market
9Defined as the mean ratio of total value from trade
with total value from trade computed offline.
10Volatility is the standard deviation. We plot against
step size on the axis– a constant factor
√
2 less than the
actual volatility.
volume decreases (i.e. as the expected inter-arrival
time increases) the McAfee method outperforms the
other mechanisms. The ewma and windowed schemes
perform almost identically and match offers well when
volatility is mild or when volume is high. When vary-
ing the maximal patience, K, we find little, if any,
relationship between K and matching efficiency.
Each of the price schedules, except fixed-price, require
that the auctioneer extract revenue from the market.
In Table 1, we present the mean and standard devia-
tion of revenue kept by the auctioneer, averaged across
all arrival intensities and for low and high volatility
trials. While the surplus extracted by the auctioneer
can be significant, under most conditions the amount
does not change the relative rankings of efficiency if
one were to consider only surplus delivered to traders.
6 DISCUSSION
We have presented a class of parameterized truthful
online DAs. The class is instantiated on fixed-price,
moving-average and McAfee-style clearing prices. The
biggest outstanding theoretical question is to under-
stand whether our class of DAs includes all truthful
online DAs. Progress in the characterization of nec-
essary properties would also drive progress in relaxing
(or solidifying) some of the current design decisions.
While the general framework is reasonably efficient,
further tuning seems possible. For example, matching
sorts bids by their simple price-schedules, fi, which
underestimates the provisional price, p˜si. To improve
the situation, we need a better estimator of the provi-
sional price that is agent-independent. We can also ex-
plore meta-schemes that track multiple counter-factual
worlds with different price schedules and switch be-
tween price schedules according to performance while
Volatility
low (
√
2/40) high (
√
2/10)
mean stdev mean stdev
mcafee 11.8% 1.2% 5.1% 1.4%
window clear 3.5% 2.0e-2% 4.8% 6.9e-2%
window median 3.4% 2.1e-2% 6.7% 1.3e-1%
ewma mean 2.9% 2.0e-3% 7.1% 2.8e-2%
fixed price 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Table 1: Expected auctioneer revenue, normal-
ized by the optimal value from trade and av-
eraged across all arrival intensities for low and
high value volatility.
maintaining truthfulness.
A number of generalizations to our model seem worthy
of study. Our current favorites include allowing for
heterogeneity in goods and agents, and also allowing
for richer models of agent patience.
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